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I. INTRODUCTION
Popular Mechanics commissioned Steven Strauss, a commer-
cial photographer, to photograph several fishing rods, reels, and
miscellaneous fishing gear.' Bryan Canniff, Popular Mechanics'
graphics director, provided the gear and helped arrange it for the
photos during two of three sessions at Strauss's studio.2 After
Strauss's third shooting session, the magazine was not satisfied
with the photographs.' Popular Mechanics then hired other pro-
fessionals to retouch the final photo. The final retouched photo,
credited to Strauss, was published in 1985, illustrating an article
entitled "What's New In Fishing Tackle.""
Without Strauss's permission, Popular Mechanics also pub-
lished a modification of the photo in a promotional insert in the
magazine.6 Strauss filed suit claiming the second use of the photo
infringed his copyrighted work. The Hearst Corporation, publisher
of Popular Mechanics, responded that publication of the photo
* B.A., 1966, Michigan State University; Ph.D., 1977, University of Minnesota. Mr.
Middleton serves as Associate Professor at the Henry W. Grady College of Journalism &
Mass Communication, University of Georgia.
1. Strauss v. Hearst Corp., 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
2. Id. at 1833.
3. Id. at 1833-34.
4. Id at 1834.
5. Id.
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constituted a fair use-an argument the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York rejected. The district
court agreed with Hearst's second argument, however, that the
publisher could republish the photo without Strauss's permission
because Strauss and Hearst were joint authors of the photo."
Hearst co-owned copyright in the photo and could use it without
Strauss's permission, provided the publisher paid Strauss his share
of the profits derived.'
Strauss, like other photographers, artists,9 film crews, 10 and
fabric designers 1 inadvertently became a joint copyright owner,
learning only after completing the work that the commissioning
party claimed joint authorship. 2 In some cases, the commissioning
6. Id. at 1836. While the court performed the four-part fair use analysis, it concluded
that an analysis of the nature of the copyrighted work, the substantiality of the portion
used, and the effect of the alleged infringement on the market for copyrighted work was
unnecessary because the "purely commercial character" of the use placed the infringement
"well outside the realm of uses conceivably protected by the fair use doctrine." Id.
7. Id. at 1836-38. A joint work is one prepared by "two or more authors with the
intention that their contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent parts of a
unitary whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). Each contributor to a joint work acquires an undi-
vided ownership in the entire work. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 n.23 (D.N.J.
1981). See M. NIMMER & D. NIMMER, 1 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 6.03, at 6-6 (1989) [herein-
after 1 NIMMER]. The joint owner may not be liable to a co-owner for copyright infringement
because an owner "cannot infringe his own copyright." Weissman v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp.
1248, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 219 (1989). Absent an agreement to the contrary, joint authors share equally in
the ownership of the joint work, even if respective contributions are not equal. 1 NIMMER, at
§ 6.08.
8. Strauss, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838. Strauss and Hearst were treated as tenants in
common:
Under the [proposed 1976 copyright revision] bill as under the present copyright
law, co-owners of a copyright would be treated generally as tenants in common,
with each co-owner having an independent right to use or license the use of a
work, subject to a duty of accounting to the other co-owners for any profits.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 121 (1976) [hereinafter H.R. REP. No. 1476]. The
revision, the 1976 Copyright Act (1976 Act), is found at 17 U.S.C. § 101 et seq. (1988).
Strauss, as a joint author, was entitled to a pro rata share of the profits generated by
Hearst's use of the photo in the promotion. Strauss, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838. However, the
judge expressed "serious doubt" that Strauss could prove with sufficient certainty the
amount due him: "The joint work used in the promotional insert constituted only one ele-
ment of the insert which was itself probably only a small portion of the total efforts used to
induce business to advertise in Popular Mechanics magazine." Id.
9. Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid, 652 F. Supp. 1453 (D.C. Cir. 1987),
rev'd, 846 F.2d 1485 (D.C. Cir. 1988), aff'd, 490 U.S. 730 (1989) (sculptor).
10. E.g., Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults of Okla. v. Playboy En-
ters., Inc., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988).
11. E.g., Mister B Textiles, Inc. v. Woodcrest Fabrics, 523 F. Supp. 21 (S.D.N.Y.
1981).
12. In Reid, the district court did not consider whether the Community for Creative
Non-Violence (CCNV) was a joint author of a sculpture it commissioned from sculptor
[Vol. 8:141
2
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol8/iss1/6
THE INADVERTENT JOINT AUTHOR
party only hired and supervised the freelancer, never contributing
copyrightable expression upon which to base a claim of joint own-
ership. 13 Whether an inadvertent joint author realizes greater re-
wards from a co-authored work than from an independently owned
work is debatable. In some cases, inadvertent co-authors might re-
alize greater rewards because freelancers' rights in joint works are
not limited to their own contributions.14 However, the co-author
runs the risk that the copyright co-owner will diminish the value of
a joint work by exploiting it exhaustively or in inappropriate set-
tings.1" Furthermore, a copyright law that permits freelancers to
become inadvertent joint authors contravenes the purpose of copy-
right, which is to encourage creative activity's in fair and predict-
able copyright relations. 7 At the very least, unsuspecting joint au-
thors may find it burdensome to learn they must share copyright
with new co-owners because former co-owners have sold their in-
terests.18 Richard Weisgrau, Executive Director of the American
Society of Magazine Photographers, points out how inadvertent
joint authors may be disadvantaged by their co-authors:
[Joint work status] deprive[s] the creator of the value of copy-
James Earl Reid, ruling instead that the sculpture was a work for hire. Reid, 652 F. Supp. at
1457. The D.C. Circuit reversed and remanded the case on the joint-authorship question.
Reid, 846 F.2d at 1499, aff'd, 490 U.S. at 753.
13. For a discussion of supervision and copyrightability, see infra text accompanying
notes 51-92.
14. Note, Manifest Intent and Copyrightability: The Destiny of Joint Authorship, 17
FORDHAM URBAN L.J. 257, 264-65 (1989) (authored by Therese M. Brady) [hereinafter Note,
Manifest Intent]. Contra CARY, STUDY No. 12: JOINT OWNERSHIP OF COPYRIGHTS 92-101, re-
printed in 1 STUDIES ON COPYRIGHT 696-705 (A. Fisher, ed., mem. ed., 1963). See also supra
note 8 (accounting between joint copyright owners often difficult).
15. See, e.g., Easter Seal Soc'y for Crippled Children and Adults of Okla. v. Playboy
Enters., Inc., 815 F.2d 323 (5th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 981 (1988) (film commis-
sioned by charitable society sold by joint author for use in sexually-oriented program).
16. "Congress shall have Power . . . To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries" U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 8. Congress reaffirmed the
nurturing function of copyright in the 1976 revision:
By substituting a single Federal system for the present anachronistic, uncertain,
impractical, and highly complicated dual system, the [proposed 1976 copyright
revision] bill would greatly improve the operation of the copyright law and
would be much more effective in carrying out the basic constitutional aims of
uniformity and the promotion of writing and scholarship.
H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 8, at 129.
17. According to the Supreme Court, "Congress' paramount goal in revising the 1976
[Copyright] Act. . . [was] enhancing predictability and certainty of copyright ownership."
Reid, 490 U.S. at 749 (citing H.R. REP. No. 1476, supra note 8, at 129).
18. Moral Rights in Our Copyright Laws: Hearings on S. 1253 Before the Subcomm.
on Patents, Copyrights and Trademarks of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 77 n.39 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 Hearings].
1991]
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right rights because they are exploited instead by better-funded
co-owners who usually do not bother (especially since they have
no legal obligation to do so) to advise the creator of the deals
that have been made, and to share the profits generated by
them.19
Independent contractors should expect commissioning parties
to claim joint authorship in a work more frequently. The United
States Supreme Court's decision in Community for Creative Non-
Violence v. Reid20 limited the circumstances in which commission-
ing parties may claim sole copyright ownership in commissioned
works for hire.2" Additionally, the increasing use of digital forms of
writing and editing invites earlier participation by commissioning
parties, further blurring the distinction between independently au-
thored and joint works. 2
To establish order and fairness in copyright relations, Senator
Thad Cochran introduced a bill in the 101st Congress2 3 that would
deny joint authorship claims to commissioning parties who do not
make original copyrightable contributions to a commissioned
work. 4 Cochran's proposal would also require that the parties to a
commissioned work sign a joint-work contract before work be-
gins.25 This Article supports the requirements of the Cochran bill
19. Id. at 77.
20. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
21. See infra notes 25, 38-50 and accompanying text. Prior to the Supreme Court's
work-for-hire ruling, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted
that more joint-works cases could be expected after the substantial cutback in the work-for-
hire doctrine as a result of the 1976 Copyright Act. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1485, 1497 n.17.
22. For a discussion on the digitalization of writing, pictures, and other communica-
tion, see M. KATSH, ELECTRONIC MEDIA AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF LAW 92-94 (1989).
23. S. 1253, 101st Cong.,. 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S7343-44 (daily ed. June 22, 1989).
S. 1253 died in committee, but Senator Cochran intends to reintroduce a similar bill in the
102d Congress. Telephone interview with Linda Roach, legislative assistant to Senator
Cochran (Jan. 30, 1991).
24. Id. S. 1253 would amend the definition of joint work in 17 U.S.C. § 101. With the
proposed language italicized, the definition would read:
"A 'joint work' is a work prepared by two or more authors with the intention
that their original contributions be merged into inseparable or interdependent
parts of a unitary whole, provided that, in the case of each specially ordered or
commissioned work, no such work shall be considered a joint work unless the
parties have expressly agreed in a written instrument, signed by them before
commencement of the work, that the work shall be considered a joint work."
S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. Rac. S7343-44.
25. Id. at S7344. S. 1253 would also exclude independent contractors working on com-
mission from being considered "employees' under the work for hire doctrine. Id. S. 1253
provides that a work made for hire be a work "prepared by a formal salaried employee
within the scope of his or her employment." Id. (emphasis added). Requiring that employ-
ees be "formal salaried" workers would have halted the practice emerging before Reid of
[Vol. 8:141
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that protect freelancers from inadvertently becoming joint authors
by requiring commissioning parties claiming joint authorship to (i)
make a copyrightable contribution, and (ii) sign a joint-work
agreement.
II. COPYRIGHTABLE CONTRIBUTIONS
A. Development of Freelancers' Rights
The copyright provision of the Constitution promotes the pro-
gress of science and the useful arts.2 6 The copyright statute stimu-
lates creative expression that benefits society by granting a monop-
oly to a copyright owner. Before the revision in 1976, copyright
statutes favored publishers over individual creators. Under the
copyright law of 1909,27 a short story writer could sue a playwright
for copyright infringement only with the cooperation of the story
writer's publisher, who most likely owned the copyright.2 8 Before
the 1976 revision of the law, independent contributors to
magazines, newspapers, and other collective works transferred all
rights, often unknowingly, when they cashed checks from their
publishers.29 Thus, a primary goal of the 1976 Act was "to clarify
and improve the present confused and frequently unfair legal situ-
ation with respect to rights in contributions" to collective works.3 0
The 1976 Act aided independent creators by relaxing notices'
commissioning parties claiming that freelancers working on commission were employees if
the commissioning party merely supervised or retained the right to supervise the free lancer.
See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text. In Reid, the United States Supreme Court
did not adopt the formal employee standard, ruling instead that an independent contractor
would be an employee only if he or she met the criteria of employees under agency law.
Reid, 490 U.S. at 750-51. See infra notes 47-50 and accompanying text. Thus, Reid went a
long way towards meeting the goals of Senator Cochran's work-for-hire provision by re-
jecting the line of cases holding that a commissioning party could claim to be the employer
simply by hiring or supervising a freelancer.
26. See supra note 16.
27. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 320, 35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
28. Dam v. Kirke La Shelle Co., 175 Fed. 902 (2d Cir. 1910).
29. Id. See also Best Medium Pub. Co. v. National Insider, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 433
(N.D. Ill. 1966), aff'd, 385 F.2d 384 (7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 955 (1968), reh'g
denied, 390 U.S. 1008 (1968).
30. H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 8, at 122. A collective work is a work "such as a
periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia, in which a number of contributions, constitut-
ing separate and independent works in themselves, are assembled into a collective whole."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). A primary goal related to clarifying confusion was to "ensur[e] pre-
dictability" of copyright relations through advance planning. Reid, 490 U.S. at 750.
31. 17 U.S.C. § 405 (Supp. 1990). See generally Middleton, Copyright Law and the
Journalist: New Powers for the Free-Lancer, 56 JOURN. Q. 38 (1979).
1991]
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and registration requirements 32 extending the duration of copy-
right,3 and allowing rights in commissioned works that are not
works for hire to be renegotiated after thirty-five years.3 4 Divisibil-
ity of copyright provided greater flexibility for independent au-
thors, allowing them to grant copyright to publishers and produc-
ers for limited uses without relinquishing all other rights, including
copyright, in the underlying work. A freelancer contributing to a
magazine or other collective work retains all copyright rights, ex-
cept for first publication rights, unless the parties expressly agree
otherwise by contract. 6 Revision of the work-made-for-hire doc-
trine, under which an employer owns the copyright in the work of
employees and some commissioned works, further strengthened
freelancers' rights.
3 7
B. Works Made for Hire
Section 101(1) of the 1976 Act provides that a work made for
hire may be produced in one of two ways. The work may be pre-
pared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment,3 8
32. 17 U.S.C. § 411 (Supp. 1990).
33. 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1988).
34. 17 U.S.C. 8 203(a) (1988).
35. 17 U.S.C. §8 201(d)(1), (2) (1988) provides that copyright owners' exclusive rights,
or any subdivision of them, may be transferred "in whole or in part" and "owned sepa-
rately." Inclusion in the 1976 Act of divisible copyright relieved freelancers from having to
seek cooperation of publishers to sue for copyright infringement. See supra text accompany-
ing notes 27-30.
36. 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988) provides:
Copyright in each separate contribution to a collective work is distinct from
copyright in the collective work as a whole, and vests initially in the author of
the contribution. In the absence of an express transfer of the copyright or of any
rights under it, the owner of copyright in the collective work is presumed to have
acquired only the privilege of reproducing and distributing the contribution as
part of that particular collective work, any revision of that collective work, and
any later collective work in the same series.
Id.
37. See infra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
38. Section 101 of the Copyright Act of 1976 defines "work made for hire" as follows:
(1) a work prepared by an employee within the scope of his or her employment;
or (2) a work specially ordered or commissioned for use as a contribution to a
collective work, as a part of a motion picture . . . as a translation, as a supple-
mentary work, as a compilation, as an instructional text, as a test, as answer
material for a test, or as an atlas, if the parties expressly agree in a written
instrument signed by them that the work shall be considered a work made for
hire.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
If a work for hire is created, the employer owns all rights:
In the case of a work made for hire, the employer or other person for whom the
work was prepared is considered the author for purposes of this title, and, unless
[Vol. 8:141
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or it may be specifically ordered or commissioned for use as a con-
tribution to a collective work, provided the parties expressly agree
in writing that the work is to be considered a work made for hire."9
Some jurisdictions limited the definition of an "employee" acting
within the "scope of his or her employment" to "formal" salaried
employees.40 Other jurisdictions, however, held that commissioned
freelancers were "employees" operating within the "scope of their
employment" when the commissioning party merely supervised a
job"1 or retained the right to supervise.42 These jurisdictions did
not require that a freelance "employee" be salaried, enjoy fringe
benefits, or meet other criteria normally associated with employ-
ment. Under such expansive interpretations of "employee" and
"scope of employment," a freelancer did not necessarily know at
the time work commenced whether the commissioning party would
later claim the freelancer was an employee creating a work for
hire. 3 Freelancers thus unintentionally became employees, inad-
the parties have expressly agreed otherwise in a written instrument signed by
them, owns all the rights comprised in the copyright.
17 U.S.C. § 201(b) (1988).
39. Id.
40. See Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093 (9th Cir. 1989) (freelance graphic artist
not a formal salaried employee).
41. The Second Circuit enunciated the actual-control test in Aldon Accessories Ltd. v.
Spiegel, Inc., 738 F.2d 548 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 982 (1984) (statuettes considered
works for hire because commissioning company exercised extensive supervision of manufac-
turing process).
42. Under the right-to-control test, it was not necessary that the hiring party supervise
the work, only that he or she retain this right. See, e.g., Town of Clarkstown v. Reeder, 566
F. Supp. 137 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (town owned copyright in handbook prepared by volunteer
without supervision); see also Epoch Producing Corp. v. Killiam Shows, Inc., 522 F.2d 737
(2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
43. In a discussion of the actual-control test, the Supreme Court wrote:
In a 'copyright marketplace,' the parties negotiate with an expectation that one
of them will own the copyright in the completed work. With that expectation,
the parties at the outset can settle on relevant contractual terms, such as the
price for the work and the ownership of reproduction rights. To the extent that
petitioners endorse an actual control test, CCNV's construction of the work for
hire provisions prevents such planning. Because that test turns on whether the
hiring party has closely monitored the production process, the parties would not
know until late in the process, if not until the work is completed, whether a work
will ultimately fall within § 101(1). Under petitioners' approach, therefore, par-
ties would have to predict in advance whether the hiring party will sufficiently
control a given work to make it the author. 'If they guess incorrectly, their reli-
ance on "work for hire" or an assignment may give them a copyright interest
that they did not bargain for.' This understanding of the work for hire provi-
sions clearly thwarts Congress' goal of ensuring predictability through advance
planning. Moreover, petitioner's interpretation 'leaves the door open for hiring
parties, who have failed to get a full assignment of copyright rights from inde-
pendent contractors falling outside the subdivision (2) guidelines, to unilaterally
1991]
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vertently creating works for hire.
Senator Cochran's bill would limit works made for hire to
those "prepared by a formal salaried employee within the scope of
his or her employment."" Although the Cochran bill is to be rein-
troduced in the 102d Congress, 6 the Supreme Court's decision in
Community for Creative Non-Violence v. Reid46 obviates the ur-
gency for legislatively narrowing the definition of "employee," as
the Cochran bill would.
In Reid, the Supreme Court ruled that whether persons who
create works on commission are employees should be determined
by applying the common law of agency. 7 Although an "employee"
is not as narrowly defined in agency law as the "formal salaried"
employee proposed in the Cochran bill, agency law requires that
several criteria be met. Among the factors to be considered in de-
termining whether an independent contractor is an employee
under agency law are the hiring party's right to control creation of
the product, the skill required, the source of the tools, the location
of the work, the duration of the relationship between the parties,
the provision of employee benefits, and the tax treatment of the
hired party. 6 In Reid, the Court found that James Earl Reid, a
sculptor commissioned to produce four homeless figures, was not
an employee of the non-profit Community for Creative Non-Vio-
lence (CCNV), the organization that commissioned the work. In so
deciding, the Court considered that CCNV did not provide Reid
with salary, regular work space, fringe benefits, or other emolu-
ments usual to employment.4 9 Under Reid, commissioning parties
are not employers simply because they supervise or retain the right
to supervise a work.
The Court remanded Reid for a determination of whether
CCNV was a joint author with Reid. If a joint author, CCNV could
obtain work-made-for-hire rights years after the work has been completed as
long as they directed or supervised the work, a standard that is hard not to meet
when one is a hiring party.'
Reid, 490 U.S. at 749-50 (citations omitted). See Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works
Made for Hire Under the 1976 Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1281, 1304 (1987).
44. 1989 Hearings, supra note 18. See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
45. See supra note 23.
46. 490 U.S. 730 (1989).
47. Id. at 751-52.
48. Id. Other factors include whether the hiring party has the right to assign addi-
tional projects to the hired party, the extent of the hiring party's role in hiring and paying
assistants, and whether the hiring party is in business. Id.
49. Id. at 753. The Court rejected the formal definition of "employee" because Con-
gress had not defined "employee" as a formal, salaried worker. Id. at 742-43 n.8.
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8
University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 8, Iss. 1 [1991], Art. 6
http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol8/iss1/6
THE INADVERTENT JOINT AUTHOR
display the sculpture and pedestal without Reid's permission, pro-
vided CCNV paid Reid a proportion of the profits earned. The ap-
pellate court had earlier suggested that Reid might be a "text-
book" example of joint authorship, in part because CCNV
conceived the idea for the sculpture and supervised Reid's work.50
C. Supervision Not Copyrightable
The subject matter of copyright subsists "in original works of
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression."5 A work
of a sole author need embody little originality to be copyright-
able.2 An author need only contribute something more than trivial
variation."3 Any expression demonstrating a modicum of intellec-
tual effort and originality suffices for a creator to claim sole au-
thorship of a work." The Supreme Court stated that originality is
"little more than a prohibition [against] actual copying. ' 5" An au-
thor is "he to whom anything owes its origin." 56 But ideas, proce-
dures, processes, systems, and concepts are not original works of
authorship capable of being copyrighted. Neither are facts.58
Photos, although "an example par excellence of a representa-
50. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1497. Reid's contribution, a steam grate pedestal on which Reid's
sculpted figures rested, qualified him for joint authorship. Id. The steam grate was, argua-
bly, an embodiment of artistic expression because it "was designed and constructed pre-
cisely 'to portray the appearance of' an actual streetside grate." Id. at 1496. See also 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988). The court was therefore satisfied that the grate, which was designed to
conform to the sculpted figures, was not an uncopyrightable utilitarian object. Reid, 846
F.2d at 1497.
CCNV's contribution of the pedestal, however, was not the primary reason for consider-
ing CCNV a joint author. The court found Reid's most prominent argument against being a
sole author to be that "CCNV was the motivating factor in the procreation of [the sculp-
ture] 'Third World America'" Id. at 1496-97. CCNV, the court said, "conceived the idea in
starkly specific detail and directed enough of [Reid's] effort to ensure that, in the end, he
had produced what [CCNV], not he, wanted .... " Id.
The court of appeals, however, is misguided in its contention that a commissioning
party's joint authorship in a work should be based primarily on the commissioning party's
"motivating" and "directing" the independent contractor and "conceiving the ideas" for the
work. Motivating, directing, and conceiving ideas are not copyrightable contributions justi-
fying joint copyright ownership for their contributors. See infra text accompanying notes
51-92.
51. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988).
52. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1496.
53. L. Batlin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 491 (2d Cir. 1976).
54. "It suffices if the author refrains from copying from prior works and contributes
more than a minimal amount of creativity." H. HENN, COPYRIGHT LAW 48 (1988).
55. Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographic Co., 188 U.S. 239, 250 (1903).
56. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 58 (1884).
57. 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1988).
58. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HARV. L. REV. 1569, 1594 (1963).
1991]
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tion of an objective fact," are copyrightable.59 As Justice Holmes
noted: "The least pretentious picture has more originality in it
than directories and the like, which may be copyrighted." 60 Pho-
tographers' originality lies in their "arranging the subject as to pre-
sent graceful outlines, arranging and disposing the light and shade,
suggesting and evoking the desired expression." ' Copyright owner-
ship belongs to the photographer who "superintend[s] the arrange-
ment.' '" 2 American courts have recognized the need to find suffi-
cient originality to warrant copyright in photographs, a quest that
reflects a concern for the expenditure of time and effort embodied
in photographs.63
The contribution of a joint author must also be an original
work of authorship. A joint work is one "prepared by two or more
authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into
inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole."6 " Con-
gress failed to define what constitutes "contributions," but courts
and commentators agree that a contribution must be a work of au-
thorship.6 5 Similarly, Congress intended that contributions to joint
59. Id. Works of authorship have never been limited to writings that can be read from
the printed page. The first copyright act included a provision that protected authors of
maps, charts, and books. Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, 1 Stat. 124. An amendment to the
copyright act in 1802 provided copyright protection to engravings, etchings, and prints. Act
of April 29, 1802, ch. 36, 2 Stat. 171. Protection was extended to photographs in 1865. Act of
March 3, 1865, ch. 126, 13 Stat. 540. The Copyright Act of 1976 protects pictorial, graphic,
and sculptural works, as well as literary, musical, and dramatic works. 17 U.S.C. § 102
(1988). Works of authorship also include pantomime and choreography, motion pictures and
other audiovisual works, and recordings. Id.
60. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250 (1903). Judge Hand later wrote: "[N]o photograph, how-
ever simple, can be unaffected by the personal influence of the author. ... Jeweler's Cir-
cular Publishing Co. v. Keystone Publishing, 274 Fed. 932, 934 (S.D.N.Y. 1921), aff'd, 281
Fed. 83 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 259 U.S. 581 (1922). Even the "least pretentious picture"
contains sufficient originality to be copyrightable. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 250. Even a very
modest grade of art expresses the author's unique personality. Id. at 251. Furthermore, "tilt
would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute them-
selves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most
obvious limits." Id.
61. Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
62. Id. at 61 (quoting Nottage v. Jackson, 11 Q.B.D. 627 (1883)). "It undoubtedly re-
quires originality to determine just when to take the photograph," another court observed,
"so as to bring out the proper setting for both animate and inanimate objects, with the
adjunctive features of light, shade, position, etc." Pagano v. Charles Beseler Co., 234 Fed.
963, 964 (S.D.N.Y. 1916).
63. Gorman, Copyright Protection for the Collection and Representation of Facts, 76
HARV. L. REv. 1569, 1596 (1963).
64. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
65. See, e.g., Reid, 846 F.2d at 1494. Nimmer wrote that a "contribution" to a joint
work must be "authorship." 1 NiMMER, supra note 7, § 6.07, at 6-18.
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works be furnished by "authors." '66 A work is "joint" if (1) the au-
thors collaborated with each other, or (2) both authors prepared
their contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would
be merged with the contributions of other authors. For example, in
Strauss v. Hearst Corp.,67 a New York court found that Brian Can-
niff, the graphics editor of Popular Mechanics, was a joint author
with Steven Strauss, the commissioned photographer, because
Canniff designed the layout for the photo, supervised some of the
shooting sessions, and provided props and arranged the
composition."
Some courts have recognized joint authorship where the au-
thors contribute only the modicum of originality required of sole
authors."9 Other courts and commentators set a higher standard of
joint authorship, requiring a contributor to a joint work to make a
more substantial contribution than a sole author." Nimmer sub-
scribes to the notion that ideas, which by themselves are not copy-
rightable 7 1 constitute contributions to joint authorship.72 Citing
Nimmer, the D.C. Circuit Court in Reid suggested that CCNV may
be a joint author with the sculptor it commissioned because the
commissioning party conceived the idea and monitored the pro-
gress of the sculpture of the four homeless persons.73
66. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
67. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
68. Id. at 1833, 1837. In Strauss, the court did not distinguish between the level of
originality necessary to claim authorship in a joint work and the work of sole authorship.
69. See, e.g., Reid, 846 F.2d at 1496. See supra text accompanying notes 52-56.
70. See, e.g., Picture Music, Inc. v. Bourne, 314 F. Supp. 640, 647 (S.D.N.Y. 1970),
afl'd, 457 F.2d 1213 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 997 (1972). Nimmer, following Picture
Music, argues that "more than the minimal copyright standard of 'distinguishable variation'
must be added" in joint works. 1 NimMER, supra note 7, § 6.03, at 6-9-10. Nimmer also
argues that supervision, which is not copyrightable by itself, might be a copyrightable con-
tribution to a joint work.
71. See infra notes 76-77 and accompanying text.
72. 1 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 6.07, at 6-18.2.
73. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1497. While noting that joint authorship requires "authorship,"
id. at 1496, the court also said that the community's supervision and addition of normally
noncopyrightable titles and legends might "count" towards a finding that the non-profit
organization was a joint author of the commissioned sculpture. Id. at 1496 n.15. See also
Dumas v. Gommerman, 865 F.2d 1093, 1105 (9th Cir. 1989) (degree of control and input
exercised by buyer may be relevant to inquiry into joint authorship).
In Reid, however, the D.C. Circuit stated: "In no case does copyright protection for an
original work of authorship extend to an idea." 846 F.2d at 1497. Whatever the court of
appeals' ambivalence to basing joint authorship on contributions of ideas, a finding of joint
authorship in Reid would not depend on supervision or other ideas of the commissioning
party. In addition to supervising work on the sculpture, CCNV qualified as a joint author by
contributing arguably copyrightable expression, the pedestal. Id.
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Supervision of a work, however, like paying for a work, has
been ruled to be too trivial and lacking in intellectual content to
constitute a copyrightable contribution to a joint work." Ideas,
even when embodied in the work of another, are not copyright-
able.7 6 Thus, home buyers who commission architects are not joint
authors by virtue of "contribut[ing] ideas and ma[king] certain
changes and exercis[ing] approval power" over an architect's
plans.7
Permitting commissioning parties to base joint authorship
claims on supervision of freelancers is both bad law and bad policy.
Hiring and supervising do not constitute authorship and thus are
not copyrightable.7 Allowing joint authorship based on supervision
grafts onto joint-authorship law the discredited and detrimental
supervision standard of work-for-hire cases.7 9 The D.C. Circuit
Court borrowed the supervision standard from the work-for-hire
doctrine as a basis for remanding the joint-works claims in Reid.80
The Circuit Court in Reid, looking to the opinion of the district
court, found that the most "prominent" arguments for considering
the commissioning party and the sculptor joint authors were
CCNV's motivation, conception of the idea for the sculpture, and
direction of the sculpture.81 The D.C. Circuit applied the lower
74. See, e.g., Dahinden v. Byrne, 220 U.S.P.Q. 719 (D. Or. 1982); see also 1 NIMMER,
supra note 7, § 6.07, at 6-18.3-6-19. But see Laskowitz v. Marie Designer, Inc., 119 F. Supp.
541 (S.D. Cal. 1954).
75. Expression in which a commissioning party gives directions and ideas is so unorigi-
nal as to be "little more than one would expect" from one who has commissioned a work.
Whelan Assocs. v. Jaslow Dental Laboratory, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 1307, 1318 (E.D. Pa. 1985).
"Such general assistance and contributions to the fund of knowledge of the author [of a
business computer program] did not make [the commissioning party] a creator of any origi-
nal work, nor even the co-author." Id. See also NIMMER, supra note 7, § 6.07, at 6-18.2- .3;
Eckert v. Hurley Chicago Co., 638 F. Supp. 699, 704 (N.D. Ill. 1986).
Nor does supervising a work "fix" expression in a tangible medium as required if it is to
be copyrighted. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). "A work is 'fixed'. . . when its embodiment in a
copy or phonorecord, . . . is sufficiently permanent or stable to permit it to be perceived,
reproduced, or otherwise communicated for a period of more than transitory duration." 17
U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
76. Rosengart, Principles of Co-Authorship in American, Comparative, and Interna-
tional Copyright Law, 25 S. CALIF. L. REV. 247 (1952) ("Nor is there co-authorship where
one person originates the idea and another embodies it: here the copyright is solely in the
person who clothes the idea with the form.").
77. Meltzer v. Zoller, 520 F. Supp. 847, 857 (D.N.J. 1981) (design sketches do not suffi-
ciently constitute fixed expressions of ideas to make home buyer a joint author of architect's
plans).
78. See supra notes 75-77 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 38-50 and accompanying text.
80. Reid, 846 F.2d at 1496-97.
81. Id. See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying text.
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court's analysis out of context. The district court had argued that
CCNV's motivation, ideas, and direction made the organization an
employer-and the sculpture a work for hire-not that CCNV's
motivation, ideas, and direction made the organization and Reid
joint authors, as the appellate court subsequently suggested.
82
While supervision is still an appropriate consideration for deter-
mining the existence of an employer-employee relationship in
work-for-hire cases,83 the court of appeals inappropriately used
non-copyrightable motivation, ideas, and direction from work-for-
hire doctrine to remand joint authorship claims.
Allowing claims of joint ownership based on the commission-
ing party's supervision of an independent contractor discourages
creativity because "[t]here is no incentive for an author to create a
work which will vest co-ownership in another who has merely con-
tributed ideas to the work." If supervision entitles a commission-
ing party to joint ownership, an employer may claim co-authorship
in nearly every case,85 thus creating a presumption that the copy-
right always belongs to the commissioning party. Some involve-
ment by the commissioning party necessarily exists in every case.
Richard Weisgrau, Executive Director of the American Society of
Magazine Photographers, comments:
A freelance photographer, for example, is always told what the
client wants, and the client inevitably has the right to accept or
reject the work. Under current law, the client can always make
the argument, however specious it may be, that the parties in-
tended to create an interdependent whole and thus that the fi-
nal product of the photographer's work qualifies as a joint work.
That argument should fail even under current law if the client
does not contribute an original work of authorship to the pro-
ject, but the lack of clear, objective criteria in the definition of
joint work means that artists will frequently be forced to either
litigate the issue or simply give in to the client's demands."
Commissioning parties' ability to base claims of joint author-
82. Reid, 652 F. Supp. at 1456.
83. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
84. Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 296. "The concept of vesting ownership
in one who has merely contributed supervision and control derives its force as a carry-over
from the work for hire doctrine." Id.
85. 1989 Hearings, supra note 18, at 65-66 (statement by Richard Weisgrau, Executive
Director of the American Society of Magazine Photographers, in testimony supporting S.
1253) (The definition of joint work is so subjective that it stands as an open invitation to
litigants to make a joint work argument in any case in which more than one person has
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ship on supervision of freelancers violates one of the paramount
Congressional policy goals of the 1976 revision of the copyright
law-to ensure predictability in copyright "through advance plan-
ning. "87 The lack of stability in joint-work cases undermines Con-
gress' attempt to bolster the position of individual authors vis-a-vis
more powerful commissioning parties.8 8 When commissioning par-
ties destabilized copyright relations by basing work-for-hire claims
on supervision of freelancers, the Supreme Court restored the bal-
ance by ruling that freelancers are employees only if they meet the
criteria of agency law. 9 Senator Cochran's bill would help correct
the imbalance in relations between joint authors by terminating a
commissioner's joint authorship claim based on supervision. 0
Cochran's proposal expressly requires that each joint author make
an original contribution to the work.91 The bill would, therefore,
protect independent contractors from having to share copyright
with a commissioning party who makes no copyrightable contribu-
tion to the work. As Senator Cochran noted: "The constitutional
imperative [of protecting authors] may not be circumvented by
describing one as a 'joint' author. One must still be an 'author.' ,,92
Merely requiring that a commissioning party contribute more
than supervision to claim joint authorship will not, by itself, ensure
that freelancers avoid becoming joint authors inadvertently. Sena-
tor Cochran's proposed legislation would also require that commis-
sioning parties and independent contractors indicate their intent
to create joint works by signing an agreement before work begins.
III. INTENT
The Copyright Act of 1976 requires that all parties to a joint
work intend their contributions be merged into inseparable or in-
terdependent parts of a unitary whole. 3 Indeed, Congress asserted
that the touchstone of a joint work is the intention at the time of
the writing that the parts be absorbed or combined. 4 In adopting
the Copyright Act, Congress rejected the Twelfth Street Rag95 rul-
87. Reid, 490 U.S. at 750.
88. See supra text accompanying notes 31-37.
89. See supra text accompanying notes 47-49.
90. See supra note 24.
91. Id.
92. S. 1253, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REC. S7343-44 (daily ed. June 22, 1989).
93. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See supra note 7.
94. H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 8, at 120.
95. Shapiro, Bernstein & Co. v. Jerry Vogel Music Co., 221 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), modi-
fied on reh'g, 223 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1955).
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ing in which the Second Circuit held that a second contributor to a
work could be a joint author even if the first author completed his
contribution without realizing that the work would be modified.
Under the 1976 Act, it is not necessary that joint authors work
near each other, in concert, or that contributions be equal in quan-
tity or quality.9 6 Nor is an express agreement to collaborate neces-
sary. 9 7 Congress declared that a work is joint "if the authors collab-
orated with each other, or if each of the authors prepared his or
her contribution with the knowledge and intention that it would be
merged with the contributions of other authors as 'inseparable or
interdependent parts of a unitary whole.' "98
The intent requirement does not depend on the state of mind
of the contributor. In Strauss v. Hearst Co.,99 the district court
ruled that Strauss manifested an intent to create a work of joint
authorship even though he never consciously planned to share au-
thorship with Hearst.100 Strauss testified that joint authorship was
never discussed with Popular Mechanics, and that he "would
never have consented to it if it had been." 101 However, it was not
necessary that Strauss intended the legal consequences of his ac-
tions.102 In other words, a freelancer could be an inadvertent joint
author.
Under the 1976 law, intent to create a work of joint authorship
should be manifested through collaboration and contributions to a
common design rather than through the subjective state of mind of
the contributor.103 Legislative panels prior to adoption of the 1976
Act rejected a subjective intent standard in joint-authorship
cases. 04 The genesis of the language in the 1976 Act, which follows
96. "It is not essential that the execution of the work should be equally divided; as
long as the general design and structure was agreed upon, the parties may divide their parts
and work separately." Maurel v. Smith, 271 Fed. 211, 215 (2d Cir. 1921). See also 1 NIMMER,
supra note 7, § 6.03, at 6-6.
97. 1 NIMMER, supra note 7, § 6.03, at 6-7.
98. H. REP. No. 1476, supra note 8, at 120.
99. 8 U.S.P.Q.2d 1832 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
100. Id. at 1837.
101. Id. at 1837 n.5.
102. Id.
103. See Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 265-69. Common design as a defini-
tion of joint authorship was adopted in American law by Judge Learned Hand in Maurel v.
Smith, 220 Fed. 195 (S.D.N.Y. 1915), afl'd, 271 Fed. 211 (2d Cir. 1921). In Maurel, Judge
Hand quoted Levy v. Rutley L.R., 6 C.P. 523 (1871), in which Judge Keating stated: "[T]o
constitute joint authorship there must be a common design." Id. at 199 (quoting Levy, 6
C.P. at 529).
104. Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 265-69.
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traditional ideas, 05 "confirms that the 'intent' element in the defi-
nition of joint work should be interpreted as an objective stan-
dard."106 The district court in Strauss found sufficient objective
evidence of collaboration on a common design to rule that Strauss
and Hearst were joint authors, stating:
Neither party denies that both intended from the start for
Strauss's photograph to be incorporated into the April 1985 arti-
cle. . . . It is apparent from Strauss's deposition that he knew
captions and other copy would be superimposed upon the photo-
graph when the article was put in its final form. To that end he
was careful to leave space in the composition of the photograph
that would accommodate such future additions.
107
While Congress intended that the intent requirement in joint
works not depend on a contributor's state of mind, it is unlikely
that Congress, in the absence of specific language, meant to
counter broader copyright goals. Yet, permitting freelancers to be-
come inadvertent joint authors undermines the provisions of the
1976 copyright law revision directed at strengthening an indepen-
dent creators' position in predictable copyright relations. 08 Per-
mitting freelancers to inadvertently become joint authors also con-
travenes the well developed trade practices inherent to predictable
copyright relations.
105. A. LATMAN, R. GORMAN & J. GINSBERG, COPYRIGHT FOR THE EIGHTIES 228 (2d ed.
1985)
106. Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 269.
107. Strauss, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d. at 1837. Other evidence of joint work cited by the court is
the addition to the photograph of "editorial copy contributed by the magazine itself, such as
captions for the fishing rods and reels as well as the initial paragraphs of the article." Id. at
1836-37. In setting out the facts in the case, the court also noted:
The contents of the photograph in question were strictly dictated by employees
of Popular Mechanics. Sometime in December 1984 the magazine's graphics di-
rector, Bryan Canniff, sent to Strauss the fishing gear that was to be the subject
of the photograph along with a sketch layout of what the photograph was to look
like. Together the two men decided on the dark blue plexiglass that forms the
prominent background for the photo. When the time came to make the actual
photograph, Canniff was present in Strauss's studio to supervise preparations for
the shoot. As part of his supervisory function, Canniff helped assemble the rods
and reels and then arranged the gear on the plexiglass background as he wanted
it. In arranging the equipment according to his layout, Canniff had to be careful
to leave dnough space to accommodate the seven captions, one illustration, title
and first two paragraphs of text that were to be superimposed on the photograph
in the finished article.
Id. at 1833 (citations omitted).
108. See supra notes 31-37 and accompanying text.
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A. Trade Practices
A relationship between a commissioning party and an inde-
pendent contractor operates on the intuitive understanding that
the commission is for someone other than the commissioning party
to create a work. A commission is an order to a second party to
perform a particular task or to carry out a work. 09 One who com-
missions a work does not generally contemplate that he will per-
form the work himself. It is also unlikely that either a freelancer or
an editor anticipates that an editor who commissions a work will
become a co-author. An editor, by definition, modifies or revises
the work of another."0 Instead of anticipating or fearing joint au-
thorship with an editor, a freelancer such as Strauss is more likely
to be wary that an editor will damage the work and thereby defile
the reputation of the author whose byline or credit line will appear
on the work."'
A freelancer often makes a contribution to a collective work, in
Strauss's case a magazine."' A contribution to a collective work is
separate and independent and, therefore, one in which a freelancer
can expect to retain copyright."18 Strauss's expectation of copyright
ownership may have been reinforced by the credit line he was
given,"" allowing him to register work in bulk, in his own name, for
copyright protection. 15 Furthermore, Strauss may have known
that a publisher's copyright on a magazine or other collective work
does not negate separate copyright on individual contributions." 6
A freelancer may feel additional security that his copyright is se-
109. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 457 (1966).
110. An editor is one "who revises, corrects, or arranges the contents and style of the
literary, artistic, or musical work of others for publication or presentation." WEBSTER'S
THIRD INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 723 (1966).
111. Editorial violations may include libel, misrepresentation, or mutilation and those
rights protected under moral rights. See, e.g., N.Y. ARTS & CULT. AFF. LAW § 14.03 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1990) (interests protected). Although it apparently was not an issue in the case,
Popular Mechanics sent Strauss's photo to a professional processing lab to have it enhanced
by computer. A retoucher at the magazine then used an airbrush to alter the color of the
background, paint in previously illegible wording on the equipment, and make other
changes. Strauss, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1834.
112. A collective work is a work "such as a periodical issue, anthology, or encyclopedia,
in which a number of contributions, constituting separate and independent works in them-
selves, are assembled into a collective whole." 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
113. Id. See also supra note 30.
114. Strauss, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1834.
115. Photographers, writers, and other freelancers publishing in collective works may
register works for copyright in a group if they retain a credit line. 17 U.S.C. § 408(c) (Supp.
1990).
116. See supra note 36.
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cure if he operates under no contract 17 or under a contract, as did
Strauss and Hearst,118 in which either party retains rights. 1 9 In
these circumstances, rights not enumerated may be reserved.
If Congress failed to protect independent contractors from
joint-works claims by commissioning parties, it is most likely be-
cause Congress did not foresee that commissioning parties would
disrupt usual trade practices by claiming joint authorship. Experts
testifying at early hearings on joint works recognized that joint au-
thorship would be an issue among creative writers and photogra-
phers working on a single project.1 20 Participants in the hearings,
however, did not mention joint authorship as an issue between cre-
ative talent and commissioning parties. One expert noted that
writers, composers, and lyricists under contract to a publisher or
producer may produce joint works; but the expert did not suggest
that the publisher or producer would be a joint author. 21
Whatever the limits of its vision, Congress has the opportunity
to redress the emerging imbalance in copyright relations by pass-
117. See Boggs v. Japp, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d 1040, 1044 (E.D. Va. 1988) (no intent to create a
joint work, in part, because no contract formed).
118. Strauss, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1837 n.5. Strauss argued that the words "First Publica-
tion Right in U.S. and Foreign" typed by Hearst on the back of his check indicated that the
parties did not intend to create a joint work. Id. The court ruled that the contract did not
abrogate Hearst's claim to joint authorship. Id. The court found adequate evidence of intent
to create a joint work, interpreting the words "First Publication Right in U.S. and Foreign"
to be a possible limit to Hearst's natural rights as a joint holder, but not as a renunciation of
joint authorship. Id. Strauss, therefore, stands for the proposition that "joint authors can
subsequently contract away their rights, but a contract will not alter the vesting of the ini-
tial tenancy-in-common." Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 278.
119. See Gilliam v. American Broadcasting Co., 538 F.2d 14, 22 (2d Cir. 1976) (Monty
Python and the BBC did not create a joint work, in part because Python stipulated in a
contract that it retained all rights not granted to the BBC).
120. See, e.g., COPYRIGHT LAw REVISION PART 3 (Preliminary Draft for Revised U.S.
Copyright Law 410 (1964)) (discussion and comments on the draft) (testimony of Harold
Orenstein). Orenstein made no suggestion that commissioning parties and those on commis-
sion might share authorship. Orenstein recommended that whether a work is joint or com-
posite-now collective-might depend on whether there was a written agreement before-
hand. Id. at 410-11.
121. Id. Orenstein also stated:
Generally, when writers start to work together they have no idea whether their
work will ultimately be published or produced or whether one or the other will
drop out of the collaboration in the middle of it. Sometimes it is because of
disagreement over the course of the collaboration and sometimes it is because
the producer or publisher (assuming that they are jointly contracted to write a
work by a producer or publisher) is not satisfied with the talents of either one or
the other. In addition, it frequently happens (in the music field particularly)
that one writes the music and one writes the lyrics. While these may be clearly
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ing Senator Cochran's bill. If the Supreme Court can remedy the
imbalance in work-for-hire relations that developed after passage
of the 1976 Act, 2' Congress can restore the balance to joint-works
relations.
Senator Cochran's bill would prohibit a commissioning party
from claiming joint authorship in a commissioned work unless both
parties agreed in writing before work began. 23 Operating under
such a requirement, commissioning parties could not claim joint
authorship without establishing the express intention of both par-
ties. The Cochran bill provides "clearer, more explicit guidance to
the public and to courts so as to discourage the indiscriminate and
unjustified assertion of joint work claims by publishers and other
parties that commission freelance talent."'
' 24
B. Criticisms of the Cochran Contract Proposal
At least two criticisms have been articulated against Cochran's
proposal, neither of which should halt its adoption. One criticism
of the Cochran bill is that the contract requirement allows a com-
missioning party to claim joint authorship in works where the com-
missioning party has not contributed authorship. 25 The attempt to
assure joint authorship status through a prior written agreement is
seen as a way to confer ownership rights on a party who is not an
author. 2 ' Indeed, the Cochran contract requirement is seen as
work for hire in another guise. 2 The commentator concluded:
"[T]here is still no basis for bestowing authorship on a commis-
sioning party who has not made a copyrightable contribution other
than to reward that party for funding the project.'
'1 28
122. See supra notes 47-50 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 24.
124. 1989 Hearings, supra note 18, at 68.
125. Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 283. "Various applications of the joint
authorship doctrine ignore the copyrightability doctrine, as though prefixing 'co-' on the
word 'author' changes the components of authorship." Id. at 283-84 (citing S. 1253, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CONG. REc. S7343 (daily ed. June 22, 1989)). "Congress never intended
to allow one who does not meet the constitutional standard of authorship to become a co-
owner of all copyright rights in that work." Id. at 284 n.175.
126. Id. at 283 n.173.
127. Id. Specifically, the author stated:
If a work does not qualify for protection under work for hire-the exception
specifically envisioned by Congress-why should it qualify under joint work? To
endow ownership rights on a party who is not an author is just work for hire in
another guise. In such a scenario, the author is given ownership as well, which
puts him in a better position than work for hire.
128. Id. The author elaborated:
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If a commissioning party claims joint authorship by paying for
a work and signing a contract, joint authorship does become noth-
ing more than "work for hire in another guise. ''129 If merely paying
for a work results in joint authorship, a commissioning party, be-
cause of superior economic power, might routinely require a free-
lancer to sign a joint-works contract, if not a work-for-hire
agreement.130
The above criticism of the contract requirement is misplaced
because the contract provision in the Cochran proposal would not
permit a commissioning party to claim joint authorship simply by
commissioning a work and signing a contract. The Cochran bill
also requires that both parties make copyrightable contributions to
a joint work." ' Thus, the Cochran proposal would not permit the
easy application of a contract requirement on which the commen-
tator relies.
A more substantial objection to the Cochran proposal is
lodged by Ralph Oman, the Register of Copyrights. 32 Oman sug-
Taking the concept of paying for the project to its fullest, even buyers of a fin-
ished work could claim [that because] they paid for it, they own the copyright.
Additionally, as coauthors, independent contractors share in both licensing
rights and control over licensing rights, therein leaving commissioning parties
with no control over the independent contractor's licensing choices.
Id.
129. Id. at 284.
130. For comments of Richard Weisgrau, Executive Director of the American Society
of Magazine Photographers, see supra text accompanying note 19.
131. See, e.g., Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 296 n.263 (quoting Senator
Cochran's statement supporting his bill).
132. Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 276 n.128. Oman states his position in
the following manner:
S. 1253 also requires that for all specially ordered or commissioned works, the
parties must, before commencement of the work, enter into a signed agreement
stating that the work is to be one of joint authorship. . . . I am unsure how it
would work in practice. Assume, for example, that the producer of an audiovi-
sual work for elementary schools commissions a friend who is a composer to
write some music for the work; the two work closely, with the producer giving
detailed comments and suggestions for both the original draft and subsequent
revisions of the music ...and the composer giving suggestions for revision of
the visual component of the work.. . . The only agreement is an oral one to split
the profits 75% -25%. Under CCNV v. Reid, it is unlikely the music would be
deemed made for hire. Under the existing statute, the work would qualify as a
joint work. Under S. 1253, though, the work could not be a joint work since no
written agreement to that effect was entered into. The question then arises, who
owns what rights? The audiovisual work here consists of 'inseparable or interde-
pendent parts' that are useful only as part of a 'unitary whole.' The easy answer
is to say each owns rights in his or her contribution, but this answer gets you no
place where each contribution is only marketed as part of the unitary whole. I do
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gests that the Cochran contract requirement would create situa-
tions in which authors who have collaborated, but not signed joint-
works contracts, could be denied the prerogatives of both the joint
author and of the sole author. What if, for example, the producer
of an audiovisual work commissions a composer-friend to compose
music for a joint audiovisual musical production?' 3 Under present
copyright law, the final product of their collaboration would be a
joint work, irrespective of whether a contract was signed."" Under
the Cochran proposal, however, the work would not be one of joint
authorship if no agreement were signed. 35 Thus, under the
Cochran bill, each contributor would be unable to market the
whole because neither would be a joint author. Each would also be
unable to exploit her separate contribution individually because
each contribution would be combined into an inseparable whole. 386
If the Cochran bill were passed, there may be unusual situa-
tions in which one commissioned a "friend," as Oman suggested,'
37
to produce a unified work that was not considered joint because no
contract was signed. In such an unlikely situation, exploitation of
the joint work or its individual contributions might be stymied.
More likely, one friend would not commission another, but would
work spontaneously, as academic colleagues might on a research
paper.'38 Spontaneous collaboration among friends and colleagues,
where neither party commissions the other and commercial gain
may not be a primary concern, would result in joint works under
the Cochran proposal as such collaboration does under present
law. "'39 The Cochran proposal, like present copyright law, would
not require a contract to certify a non-commissioned joint work.
The Register of Copyright's criticism is perhaps more applica-
ble in the commercial context of a publisher or producer commis-
sioning a freelance work. In this case, a commissioning party might
contribute expression to a unified work that would not be consid-
ered a joint work under the Cochran bill if no contract were signed.
In this situation, the Cochran bill may prevent the parties from
exploiting either the whole work-because neither contributor
Id.
133. Id.
134. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 24.
136. See Note, Manifest Intent, supra note 14, at 276 n.128, 283 n.173.
137. See supra note 132.
138. See, e.g., Weissmann v. Freeman, 684 F. Supp. 1248, 1260 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), aff'd
in part, rev'd in part, 868 F.2d 1313 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 219 (1989).
139. See supra notes 7 & 24.
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could claim joint authorship-or an individual contribu-
tion-because each contribution would be inseparable from the
other. 14 0
To avoid the stalemate Oman describes, the Cochran bill
should be interpreted to mean that ownership in a commissioned
work belongs to the independent contractor unless a contract stip-
ulates otherwise. This interpretation conforms to present copyright
law governing contributions to collective works.14 1 Section 201(c) of
the 1976 Act vests all rights, except first publication rights, in the
author of a contribution to a collective work.112 Vesting all rights in
the freelancer serves three purposes. First, it bars the commission-
ing party from making the independent contractor an inadvertent
joint author, either through the commissioning party's supervision
or expressive contributions. Second, it furthers the copyright pol-
icy goals of enhancing the powers of creative authors through pre-
dictable copyright relations."1 3 Finally, it properly places the bur-
den to contract on the commissioning party-the party usually in
the stronger economic position to bear the costs of contracting and
the losses of forfeited copyright ownership.
44
IV. CONCLUSION
Independent contractors working on commission should be
protected from inadvertently becoming joint authors of commis-
sioned works. Allowing commissioning parties to claim joint au-
thorship in commissioned work they supervise creates unstable
copyright relations that discourage the creative enterprise and un-
dermine the stability that the copyright law is designed to foster.
To discourage the gratuitous joint-authorship claims of commis-
sioning parties, Congress should pass the Cochran bill, which
would recognize joint authorship in commissioned works only if all
parties contribute copyrightable expression and a joint-work con-
tract is signed before work begins.
140. See supra note 24.
141. See 17 U.S.C. § 201(c) (1988).
142. Id.
143. See supra notes 16-17.
144. See Hamilton, Commissioned Works as Works Made for Hire Under the 1976
Copyright Act: Misinterpretation and Injustice, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1281, 1308-1311 (1987).
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